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Non-Technical Summary 
This paper investigates two central questions. Are there long-term effects of regulation on 
innovation? Does the impact of different types of regulation differ by type of the environ-
mental benefit of the innovations? The overwhelming majority of regulations considered in 
this paper are of the command-and-control type, and thus, non-market based. The theoretical 
literature offers clear arguments, why command-and-control regulations are not dynamically 
efficient, which means that they do not provide a sufficient amount of long-term innovative 
incentives compared to market based instruments. One possible explanation might be that 
there is no further need to adapt after a given performance standard is achieved. Nevertheless, 
a notable amount of firms stated in the European Community Innovation Survey (CIS) that 
environmentally related innovations have been introduced in response to regulations from the 
1950s and 1970s. Therefore, contrary to conventional wisdom, non-market based regulation 
might also provide a certain amount of long-term innovative incentives. 
The present study uses data from the German part of the CIS in 2009, the Mannheim In-
novation Panel (MIP). Evidence for nine different classes of environmental benefits of intro-
duced innovations is provided by a question where firms were asked to state the amount of 
environmental benefits (ranging between no, low, medium, and high benefits). Furthermore, 
firms were asked about the determinants of these innovations. The focus in this paper is only 
on governmental regulation. In cases where innovations are introduced due to regulatory con-
straints, firms were asked to cite the respective laws to be responsible for these innovations. 
These laws were classified into three major fields of environmental policy and furthermore, 
the effective dates of these laws were identified. Almost all of the cited regulations are non-
market based. 
The ordered probit estimation approach used in this paper provides only limited support 
for innovative effects of these three policy types in general. They only trigger environmen-
tally related innovations for strongly related environmental aspects. In addition to this finding, 
the results provide evidence for long-term innovative effects of command-and-control regula-
tion. However, such long-term effects of regulation on environmentally related innovation do 
not exist for all of the examined environmental benefits of innovations. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
In diesem Aufsatz werden zwei zentrale Fragestellungen untersucht. Zum einen, ob es 
Langzeiteffekte von Umweltregulierungen auf Innovationsaktivitäten mit Umweltrelevanz 
von Unternehmen gibt. Zum anderen wird danach gefragt, inwieweit sich verschiedene Typen 
von Umweltpolitikmaßnahmen in ihrer Wirkung auf Innovationen mit verschiedenen Um-
weltwirkungen unterscheiden. Die überwiegende Mehrheit der hier untersuchten Regulierun-
gen entstammt dem Ordnungsrecht, ist also nicht marktbasiert. In der theoretischen Literatur 
ist relativ unstrittig, dass ordnungsrechtliche Politikmaßnahmen nicht dynamisch effizient 
sind, d.h. dass von ihnen keine hinreichend hohen bzw. kaum dauerhafte Innovationsanreize 
ausgehen verglichen mit marktbasierten Instrumenten. Ein Grund hierfür mag sein, dass kein 
weiterer Anpassungsbedarf an gesetzliche Vorschriften mehr besteht sofern ein gewisser 
Umweltstandard erreicht worden ist. Dennoch gab eine beträchtliche Anzahl von Unterneh-
men in der europaweiten Innovationserhebung (CIS) an, dass sie aufgrund staatlicher Regulie-
rungen aus den 1950er und 1970er Jahren Innovationen mit Umweltrelevanz eingeführt ha-
ben. Aus diesem Grund ist zu erwarten, dass – entgegen der vorherrschenden Meinung – auch 
von nicht marktbasierten Instrumenten der Umweltpolitik durchaus langfristige Innovations-
anreize ausgehen können. 
Diese Studie verwendet Daten aus der deutschen Erhebung des CIS von 2009, dem 
Mannheimer Innovationspanel (MIP). Aufschluss über die eingeführten Innovationen mit 
Umweltrelevanz in insgesamt neun verschiedenen Kategorien gibt eine Frage, bei der die 
Firmen zwischen keinem, wenig, mittlerem und hohem Beitrag zum Umweltschutz der einge-
führten Innovationen wählen können. Zusätzlich wurden die Untenehmen nach den Treibern 
genau dieser Innovationen befragt, von denen wir uns ausschließlich auf staatliche Regulie-
rung konzentrieren. Wurden Innovationen aufgrund von Regulierungen eingeführt, so wurde 
zusätzlich nach den konkreten Gesetzen und Vorschriften gefragt. Diese Gesetze wurden in 
drei zentrale Umweltpolitikfelder eingeordnet und für jede genannte Regulierung deren Zeit-
punkt des Inkrafttretens ermittelt. Es wurden überwiegend ordnungsrechtliche Vorschriften 
zitiert. 
Die in diesem Aufsatz verwendete Ordered Probit Schätzung zeigt, dass von diesen drei 
Typen von Umweltpolitikmaßnahmen nur beschränkte Innovationswirkungen auf unmittelbar 
regulierte Umweltprobleme ausgehen. Es zeigt sich jedoch auch, dass von ordnungsrecht-
lichen Maßnahmen durchaus langfristige Innovationswirkungen ausgehen können, allerdings 
nicht für alle der hier untersuchten Bereiche des Umweltschutzes.  
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1 Introduction 
In the last decades, environmental concerns were increasingly considered by policymak-
ers. However, in order not to hamper national competitiveness and economic growth, envi-
ronmentally friendly technological changes are necessary to ensure mitigation of environ-
mental burdens. The present paper will not discuss the determinants of these environmentally 
related technological changes. It will instead focus on one special driver of environmental 
innovations: governmental regulations. Regarding this special driver of environmental regula-
tion, there has been a lively debate especially regarding the costs and benefits of regulation 
and innovation (see Porter and van der Linde 1995; Palmer et al. 1995). The present paper 
does not participate in this debate. It tries to answer two central research questions: First, 
whether there are long term effects of environmental regulations on innovations. Second, 
whether the impact of different types of environmental policy differs by type of eco-
innovative activities of firms. 
For this purpose we use firm level data on innovative activities with environmental im-
pacts from the German part of the Community Innovation Panel (CIS) 2009. The database 
provides information about special regulations which forced firms to introduce innovations 
with positive environmental impact in nine different categories. For regulations to be respon-
sive for firms environmental innovations, we calculate the age of the cited regulations in order 
to shed light on the question whether there are long-term effects of old regulations on innova-
tions. 
Regulations in our database are mostly of the command-and-control type. These regula-
tions have some important disadvantages in so far as they do not enable equalization of mar-
ginal pollution abatement costs and dynamic efficiency. Thus, the conventional wisdom 
would be that there are no long-term effects of command-and-control regulations. This is in-
deed anticipated, because companies have no incentive to innovate further after a required 
environmental standard is achieved. However, this paper identifies long-term effects of regu-
lation on the majority of the different environmental impacts of innovations. 
In addition to this, the second research question deals with the impact of different types 
of command-and-control regulation with regard to different environmental impacts of innova-
tions. This research question needs to classify regulations quoted by companies according to 
major policy types. Also for this research question the paper finds evidence. The main result 
is that types of regulations differ with respect to their impact on several environmental bene-
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fits of innovations. However, the results are weak with respect to some of the examined envi-
ronmental benefits.  
To our knowledge, both, to use the age of environmental regulations and their classifica-
tion with regard to several policy types are novel in such an analysis. Especially the first re-
search question regarding the long-term effects of regulation on innovation is a new way of 
analysing this topic. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section presents important 
research on the impact of environmental regulation on innovation. Section three gives a brief 
discussion of Germany’s environmental regulation development. This is required in order to 
define the policy phases for the econometric analysis presented in section four. The results are 
given in section five, followed by a brief discussion of the results and suggestions for further 
research in section six. Section seven concludes. 
2 Environmental innovation and regulation 
Before dealing with the term "eco-innovation", it is necessary to define what is covered 
by the term in the present paper, because the definition used here differs in some ways from 
what an economist normally would call an innovation. Normally, innovation is defined to be 
the first introduction of a new product, process, service or organizational structure into the 
market (Schumpeter, 1934). In this analysis, however, innovations with positive environ-
mental impacts (hereafter eco-innovations) are defined to be environmental related innova-
tions per se and also the adoption of these innovations. Why? The CIS data used in this paper 
can hardly distinguish between the first introduction on the market or the novelty only to the 
firm. The simple reason is that to a considerable degree, even companies do not know whether 
a new process or product, leading to less environmental burdens, is new to the market or only 
new to them. To put it in a nutshell: the definition used in this essay does not distinguish be-
tween innovation and technology diffusion or adoption. Kemp and Pearson (2008) use a simi-
lar definition. 
 Apart from other factors such as market forces, environmental policy has been identified 
as an important driving force for innovations with environmental benefits; see Jaffe et al. 
(2002) for a comprehensive literature survey. Based on some case studies, Porter (1991) and 
Porter and van der Linde (1995) find that innovations are introduced in response to environ-
mental regulation. They also argue that these innovations increase competitiveness. Lanjouw 
and Mody (1996) find evidence by looking at patent applications that environmental regula-
tion stimulates related innovations. Newell et al. (1999) find empirical evidence that, beside 
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other impact factors, governmental regulation leads to energy efficiency innovations. The 
study of Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003) reveals evidence for innovations stimulated by pol-
lution abatement and control expenditure, which is a measure for regulatory burdens. In con-
trast to these findings, Jaffe and Palmer (1997) find no significant impact of regulatory com-
pliance costs on patent applications by applying a macro-level panel data analysis. Further-
more, a study of Snyder et al. (2003) comes to the conclusion that there is no significant im-
pact of regulation on technology adoption at all. 
Also in analysis of innovation surveys regulation has been identified as an important de-
terminant of environmental innovation (together with technology push, market pull and firm-
specific factors). In this context, the impact of regulation on innovation is discussed as “regu-
latory push/pull effect” (Rennings 2000). The regulatory push/pull effect has been confirmed 
by several survey studies, including Green (1994), Cleff and Rennings (1999), Rennings and 
Zwick (2002), and Horbach (2008). Del Rio Gonzalez (2005) identified regulation pressure 
and corporate image as the main incentives for adopting cleaner technology in the Spanish 
pulp and paper industry. Frondel et al. (2007) find that generally policy stringency is an in-
creasingly important driving force behind environmental innovations rather than the choice of 
single policy instruments. Arimura et al. (2007) provide the same empirical evidence for the 
effect of regulation on green R&D, i.e. that stringent environmental policy stimulates green 
R&D rather than the choice of a certain policy instrument. Facilities facing very stringent en-
vironmental regulation are more likely to conduct environmental R&D. 
The regulatory push/pull effect has also been confirmed by patent studies. Recently, Popp 
(2006) found evidence in a study with patent data from the United States, Japan and Germany 
that innovation decisions of companies were mainly driven by national regulation, not by 
regulation abroad. Johnstone et al. (2010, p. 146) find evidence for the special case of renew-
able energy innovation that “[…] policy, rather than prices, appears to be the main driver of 
innovation in these technologies”.  
So far, literature on the relationship between environmental policy and technological 
change has mainly focused on the choice of an optimal policy instrument to trigger environ-
mental innovations (Jaffe et al., 2002). The superiority of market-based instruments like taxes 
and tradable permits has long been the basic tenet in environmental economics. These instru-
ments were identified as environmental policy instruments with the highest dynamic effi-
ciency (innovation efficiency). Their advantage is that they provide permanent incentives for 
further, cost-efficient emissions reductions. Or as Jaffe and Stavins (1995) summarise: “Theo-
retical economic analysis have generally supported the notion that market based approaches 
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provide the most effective long-term incentives for invention, innovation, and diffusion” 
(Jaffe and Stavins 1995, p. S-45). Furthermore, they provide empirical support for the case of 
housing efficiency innovations. 
 Traditionally, command and control regulation is the most popular instrument for avoid-
ing environmental externalities. It is a general term for regulatory requirements, standards or 
prohibitions. In economic literature most economists consider command-and-control regula-
tion to be less preferable than market-based approaches. Rightly, it is often argued that com-
mand and control regulation does not provide efficient incentives for abatement of environ-
mental externalities and because of this, it provides little incentives for environmental innova-
tion. However, as mentioned before in the introduction, we expect innovation effects of com-
mand and control instruments to be more dynamic than assumed in theory. Needless to say 
that in this study, we cannot compare the dynamic effects of command-and-control with those 
of market-based instruments, since we only have information on non-market based regula-
tions. Such comparison is offered for instance by Downing and White (1986), and Milliman 
and Prince (1989). As it might be expected, they found direct controls (command-and-control) 
to perform worst with regard to dynamic innovation effects compared to auctioned permits or 
emission taxes1. Kerr and Newell (2003) provide empirical support based on an analysis of 
the petroleum industry. They find that lead-reducing technology adoption is higher under 
market based regulation than under performance standards. Also Porter (1991) and Porter and 
van der Linde (1995) argue that market-based regulations provide greater incentives for intro-
ducing environmental innovations. Nevertheless, this paper tries to shed light on the question 
whether there are long-term effects of command-and-control regulations on innovative activi-
ties. 
We think this is also of some interest since command-and-control regulation seems to be 
favourable under some very limited circumstances. As Hahn and Stavins (1992) argue, such 
cases are for instance highly localized pollution problems where source-specific standards 
could be more appropriate. Furthermore, even against the background of the superiority of 
market-based regulations, command-and-control is the most common policy instrument. Stav-
ins (1998) argues that political economy constraints may account for this situation. 
 
1 An interesting empirical result is offered by Popp (2003). Surprisingly Popp concludes that innovative activi-
ties under command and control regulation are higher than under the permit market. But Popp (2003) also finds 
that innovation to comply with command and control regulation is only done to lower regulatory compliance 
costs but not to reduce emissions. However, the market based instrument leads to R&D with regard to both cost 
savings and reduction of emissions. 
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Is there any evidence for long-term dynamic effects of command-and-control regulation 
on environmental innovations? By using US patent data, Popp (2002) found evidence that 
increasing energy prices result in energy saving innovations at a later stage. More precisely, 
he argues that for using unweighted counts of patents “half of the effect of the 1973 oil price 
shock on innovation would have passed by 1987” (Popp 2002, p. 173). For the weighted pat-
ent data, the estimated time lag was lower (4.86 years on average). Are these findings of Popp 
(2002) also relevant for a study on long-term effects of command-and-control regulation on 
innovation rather than for an effect of price changes on innovation? We think they are. This is 
because by assuming that tightened environmental regulations increase the “probability of a 
sanction for violating a performance standard” (Jaffe and Stavins 1995, p. 47), the expected 
costs for violating these regulations will rise, too. This allows an interpretation of such tight-
ened regulations as increases in relative prices for using the more polluting technology. Jaffe 
and Stavins (1995) used a similar approach. In their model, the time of technology adoption 
amongst other things depends on the “probability of a sanction for violating a performance 
standard” (Jaffe and Stavins 1995, p. 47). To our knowledge, the finding of Popp (2002) that 
the 1973 oil price shock still triggered innovation until 1987 is the only empirical evidence of 
such long-term effects2. For command-and-control regulation rather than oil price shocks, 
there is no comparable study. Therefore, the present approach tries to close this research gap. 
3 Environmental regulation in Germany 
The development of the German environmental policy can be divided into several phases 
which will be discussed in some detail below. Note that there is no unified classification of 
the different phases or types in literature. Literature tends to classify environmental policy 
phases by time or election periods (see i.e. Jänicke et al. 2003 or Schmidt 2007). By defining 
phases of environmental policy, we deviate from German environmental policy literature and 
distribute environmental standards, laws, and regulations into four categories: First, the End-
of-Pipe category, which includes for example the BImSchG, TA-Luft, REACH and more. 
Second, we introduce a category which covers the circular economy policy regulations like 
 
2 Please note that long term effects should not be mistaken for time lags. Without any doubts, innovative activi-
ties, regardless of whereof they are triggered, need time until innovation output is created. As mentioned, we are 
not able to measure innovation per se. Our database measures innovation and adoption together. A time lag is the 
time span from the impulse to engage in innovative activities until the innovation is introduced into the market. 
If it is ask for long term effects, however, it is meant whether impulses from years ago (like old regulations) can 
still today provide incentives to adopt innovations. Since it is unlikely that an innovation activity triggered by the 
1973 oil price shock and started at this time needs until 1987 or later to be finished (that would be a large time 
lag), the findings of Popp (2002) can regarded to be such long term effects. 
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the VerpackV, KrW-/AbfG, RoHS and WEEE. Third, a category for managerial environ-
mental policies is introduced here, including for instance the EMAS or ISO 14001 guideline. 
The climate protection policies are summarized into a fourth class, including for instance the 
EEG, EnEV, EuP and many more. 
Sectoral End-of-Pipe          
This phase includes the first two periods of environmental policy in Germany. The first 
can also be called the phase of establishment (1969 up to 1973). This period is characterised 
by broad governmental initiatives for basic environmental regulations (Jänicke et al., 2003). 
The most important example of this early green policy is the environmental program of 1971, 
which allowed environmental policy to be of the same importance as other fields of policy 
(Wicke, 1993; Altmann, 1997). More than 100 laws were enacted within this period (Jänicke, 
2009). It has often been criticised that this early environmental policy only consisted of meas-
ures for the redistribution of pollutants rather than a strict pollutant abatement policy (Jänicke 
et al., 2003). This phase can also be characterised as the “policy of the high chimney”. The 
following, second phase from 1974-1982 is characterised by a slowdown of environmental 
policy initiatives by the government. Because of recessions after the two oil crises in 1974 
and 1980/81, environmental policy received less attention by policymakers and was more than 
ever discredited to be a job-killer (Schmidt, 2007). Nevertheless, important regulations were 
created in this phase, like the Federal Immission Control Act (BImschG) in 1974 to limit 
harmful pollutants, noise, etc. Thus, this phase of German environmental policy is character-
ised by an ongoing policy of the distribution of pollutants like in the phase from 1969 up to 
1973 but also by further end-of-pipe regulations, especially for water pollution control 
(Jänicke et al, 2003). 
As end-of-pipe regulations were also created in later phases (i.e. the “TA Luft” from 
1986 or the REACH act from 2007, which encompasses the registration, evaluation, authori-
sation and restriction of chemicals) and older regulations were revised, we subsume all these 
emission regulation reforms or tightening under one general policy phase (or policy type) that 
we call end-of-pipe regulation. 
Cleaner production 
The next phase is characterised by increasing activities concerning environmental issues 
by the new government in 1982. In the literature there is no unified opinion on the length of 
these periods. Schmidt (2007) defines the end of this phase as the beginning of the administra-
tion of the social democratic and green (environmental) government in 1998. In contrast, 
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Jänicke et al. (2003) approximately equate the environmental policy phases with the admini-
stration periods. In the recent approach, we define this phase of environmental regulation to 
consist of cleaner production policies like for instance the environment damage act 
(USchadG). Furthermore, existing end-of-pipe regulations have been improved within this 
period. In the German Innovation Panel 2009, only a very small number of companies re-
ferred to regulations belonging to cleaner production policy. For this reason, we do not intro-
duce a phase of cleaner production on it’s own. Other regulations from this phase are also of 
the end-of-pipe type. 
Circular-Flow-Economy 
According to Jänicke et al. (2003), we set the beginning of the third phase of environ-
mental standards for the year 1988. A large part of this phase belongs to the age of environ-
mental minister Klaus Töpfer, including several take back systems. Important regulations of 
this phase are for instance the Packaging Act (VerpackV from 1991) for reducing environ-
mental burdens from packaging waste or the Act for Promoting Closed Substance Cycle 
Waste Management and Ensuring Environmentally Compatible Waste Disposal (KrW-/AbfG 
from 1996) which can be seen as the central German law related to waste disposal. There are 
also newer circular economy regulations like for instance the RoHS and the WEEE guidelines 
from 2002 by the European Community. The RoHS guideline limits the use of hazardous 
chemicals in electronic appliances and the goal of the WEEE directive is to reduce electronic 
waste by a guideline for producers of electronic appliances. With regard to these examples 
and further laws and acts since 1988 relating to waste disposal and resource recycling, we 
define this phase as the policy type of circular-flow-economy regulation. 
Climate Policy 
The begin of the mandate of the “greener” government in 1998, consisting of social de-
mocrats and the green party, opened new opportunities for further environmental protection 
policies (Jänicke, 2009). Within this election period, many regulations for reducing green 
house gas emissions were passed. The most important regulations are the Renewable Energy 
Sources Act (EEG) of 2000, the Energy Saving Act (EnEV) of 2002 and the Combined Heat 
and Power Act (KWKG) of 2002. A further important regulation from this period is the Di-
rective for Energy using Products (EuP) by the European Commission in 2005. Because all 
these acts and directives were passed for climate change mitigation, we will subsume them 
under the main category of climate policy. 
The figure below presents all three mentioned policy types we defined above in a tempo-
ral order. 
 
Climate-Policy 
Circular-Flow-Economy 
End-of-Pipe regulations 
2000 2010 19901950 1960 1970 1980
Figure 1: Temporal order of the defined policy phases 
4 Database and descriptive statistics 
The present paper uses data from the 2009 version of the Mannheim Innovation Panel 
(MIP) which is the German part of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS). Here, companies 
were asked whether they introduced innovations with positive environmental benefits, in the 
following areas: a) a decline of material usage, b) a reduction of energy use, c) a reduction of 
CO2 emissions, d) a reduction of air emissions (i.e. SOx, NOx), e) a reduction of water pollu-
tion, f) a reduction of soil pollution, g) a reduction of noise, h) a compensation for dangerous 
inputs, or i) an improvement of recycling. These nine questions serve as our dependent vari-
ables. Consequently, the model which will be discussed in the next section is calculated for 
every of the nine different environmental benefits of innovations separately. 
The recent approach uses data from 419 observations in which firms stated that these in-
novations where introduced due to environmental regulation. Even more important, the com-
panies reported the respective regulations to be responsive for innovations. As it was argued 
in the introduction, we expect regulation to differ in its impact on the nine categories. In an-
other step, the age of the cited regulations was identified and each regulation mentioned by 
the firms was distributed to the three types of environmental policy already defined in the 
previous section (end-of-pipe (T_EOP), circular-flow-economy (T_CFE), and climate-policy 
(T_CPO)). To put it in a nutshell: the recent paper is not interested in the determinants of in-
novation with environmental benefits. It is rather interested in the impact of different policy 
types and especially on long term effects of environmental policy on innovation with envi-
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ronmental benefits in the nine categories. In addition to data on environmental innovation and 
regulation, the MIP offers other corporate data, like the number of employees, industry affilia-
tion, etc. The number of employees serves as a measure for company size in the present ap-
proach. 
The descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in this paper are presented in 
the table below. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
T_EOP 419 0.601432 0.4901888 0 1
T_CFE 419 0.2529833 0.4352411 0 1
T_CPO 419 0.2410501 0.428232 0 1
AGE 419 13.22434 14.59443 0 52
SIZE 419 2053.866 17655.28 2 282758
EAST 419 0.3126492 0.4641269 0 1
NACE_2 419 0.4582339 0.4988482 0 1
NACE_3 419 0.1885442 0.3916137 0 1
NACE_4 419 0.1073986 0.3099894 0 1
NACE_5 419 0.0405728 0.1975342 0 1
NACE_6 419 0.0334129 0.179927 0 1
NACE_7 419 0.0692124 0.2541184 0 1
NACE_89 419 0.0214797 0.1451503 0 1
Table2: Descriptive Statistics
 
60.1 % of the 419 companies who stated laws and regulation to have triggered innova-
tions were affected by end-of-pipe regulations. Further 25.3 % were affected by circular-flow-
economy regulation and 24.1 % by climate policy regulations. It is important to note that the 
circular-flow-economy type contains among other things the RoHS and the WEEE guidelines 
of the European Commission, which accounts for more than 70 % of all cited circular-flow-
economy regulations. As mentioned before, the RoHS guideline limits the use of hazardous 
chemicals (i.e. lead) in electronic appliances. This fact taken into account, we expect the cir-
cular-flow-economy type to have significant impact especially on innovations with positive 
impacts on the compensation for dangerous inputs. In addition to this, the WEEE regulation 
sets standards for the recyclability of electronic products, and is therefore expected to affect 
innovations with positive impact on improvements of recycling possibilities to a significant 
degree. 
The figure below presents the age of all regulations referred to.  
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Figure 1: Absolute frequency diagram of all cited regulations in the database 
The approximately 20 quoted regulations dating back 52 years, are related to the German 
Water Pollution Control Act (WHG) from 1957, which is of the end-of-pipe type. The large 
column at an age of 35 years contains the German Federal Immission Control Act (BImschG) 
from 1974. The largest column contains, among other guidelines, the RoHS and the WEEE 
guidelines from 2005, which are of the circular-flow-economy type. The second largest col-
umn which contains approximately 80 citations includes amongst other regulations (like for 
instance the EURO 5 emission standard for cars) the REACH directive from 2007, which is a 
very new end-of-pipe regulation. A major part of the two columns between ages of five up to 
ten years accounts for climate policy regulations, like the Energy Saving Act (EnEV) from 
2002. 
5 Estimation strategy 
This paper analyses whether there are long term impacts of environmental regulation on 
eco-innovation, and whether the impact of the four phases or types of environmental regula-
tion (defined in section three) differs by type of corporate eco-innovative activities. To con-
sider these central research questions, we use a sub-sample of 419 Mannheim Innovation 
Panel 2009 companies, which introduced or adopted innovations with positive impact on the 
environment. Note that these innovations were imposed just because companies were forced 
to innovate by environmental regulation. The dependent variables for nine different environ-
mental benefits of innovations (ECOINNO), are, however, not continuous variables. They 
measure the amounts of environmental benefits of innovations in an ordered scale ranging 
from no innovation with environmental benefits (j = 0), innovation with low (j = 1) and me-
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dium (j = 2) environmental benefits, up to innovation with high environmental benefits (j = 3). 
Therefore, the regression takes the following form: 
  *i i i iiECOINNO ln AGE Z i       P  C  (1) 
 iECOINNO j     if    *j 1 i jECOINNO     (2) 
where  and . The α’s are unknown parameters and represent the threshold 
values for moving from one category of environmental benefits of an innovation to another. 
They were estimated together with the other coefficients. 
j 0,1,...,m m 3
The vector P represents a set of three dummy variables for the three policy phases or 
types already defined (end-of-pipe (T_EOP), circular-flow-economy (T_CFE), and climate 
policy (T_CPO)). Also the year of the coming into force of the mentioned regulations was 
used to calculate their age (not the age of the policy phase). As pointed out in the introduction, 
we expect long-term impacts of environmental regulation. Accordingly, the age variable 
ln(AGE) which represents the natural logarithm of the age of the respective regulations is a 
further regressor of interest. In addition the ln(AGE), Z is a dummy variable related to the 
regulations’ age. Both, the construction of the age variable and the related dummy will be 
discussed in detail in the next paragraph. The vector C represents further control variables, 
including a set of industry dummies, company size and a dummy for firms in the Eastern part 
of Germany. The control variables will be discussed later in the corresponding paragraph. 
Finally, ε represents unobservable impacts on the amount of environmental benefits of intro-
duced innovations. 
Since the dependent variables are in ordinal scale, the model described above is estimated 
using an ordered probit. The use of the ordered probit model requires the assumption of stan-
dard normally distributed unobservable factors ε. Furthermore, it relaxes the assumption of a 
logit or ordered logit model that unobservable impacts on the dependent variable are uncorre-
lated over its different categories. We think this flexibility is needed since the categories of 
having introduced innovations with a certain amount of environmental benefits are likely to 
be affected by other unobservable factors. Such unobserved factors are, for instance, the age 
of the corporate capital stock or financial constraints, which are possibly correlated with the 
amount of environmental benefits of introduced innovations or adopted technologies.  
Construction of the age variable 
 The age of the cited regulations was calculated by using the year in which the original 
version of the regulation came into force. If companies referred to a special amendment of the 
regulation, this date was used instead. The oldest regulation was used if more than one regula-
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tion was cited. In 23 out of 419 observations, companies referred to regulations from 2009 
(i.e. the euro-5 emission standard) forcing them to introduce innovation. The age variable is 
zero in these cases. At the same time, companies also referred to very old regulations (i.e. 
water pollution regulation from the 1950s, where still no adjustment exists). In order not to 
overestimate these very old regulations, rearranging the age data by calculating the logarithm 
seems to be useful. But this rearrangement causes a problem. Calculating the logarithm of the 
age zero observations is not possible and we would end up in loosing these 23 observations. 
For this reason, we rearranged the data as follows: ln_ AGE ln(AGE e) 1   where ln_AGE is 
the new variable of interest and AGE represents the true age of the respective regulation. This 
rearrangement ensures that the regulations from 2009 with a true age of zero also have a value 
of zero after the manipulation. But in order to address the fact that also innovation were intro-
duced due to regulation enacted in 2009, we introduce a dummy variable with the value of 
one for this cases and zero otherwise. Hausman et al. (1984) used a similar solution to tackle 
with the “zero value problem” but for a dependent variable with zero values. In the present 
paper the “zero value problem” occurs for an independent variable. 
The logarithm of the age variable is also useful because a linear relationship between the 
age of the regulation and innovative incentives seems less reasonable. The logarithm version 
suggests that the incentive to introduce a technology because of regulative constraints in-
creases with age but the additionally incentive declines for every further year. We also tested 
a linear and quadratic term of the age variable together. If the coefficient of the quadratic term 
would be negative such a functional form would imply increasing innovative incentives with 
increasing age until a peak is reached. For older regulations, incentives to innovate would 
decrease. We expected this case to be the most reasonable one but found no significant evi-
dence for such a case at all. For this reason, we employ the logarithm version since it allows 
at least decreasing “marginal incentives” of the age of regulation. The use of the linear term 
would mean to assume unrealistic proportional increasing incentives with the age of regula-
tion. To sum up, the age of the regulation and the type of regulation serves as our regressors 
of main interest in the estimation. 
Control variables  
Other control variables will be used in the model to control for other impacts on the 
amount of environmental benefits of introduced innovation. These are the logarithm of the 
company size, a dummy for the Eastern part of Germany and various industry dummies. The 
size variable addresses the assumption that large companies tend to engage more often in in-
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novative activities (Schumpeter, 1942). Furthermore, by assuming that larger companies may 
produce more standardised products with help of more capital intensive production tech-
niques, it can be assumed that these production technologies cause more pollution. Thus, if 
there are strict environmental standards, larger firms have more incentives to abate pollution 
by introducing environmental technology. The model also contains a dummy with value one 
for firms located in the eastern part of Germany. 
In addition to the size variable, sector dummies are used to control for sector specific un-
observed cross-sectional differences. The sector dummies represent one-digit NACE codes. 
NACE 0 (agriculture, fishing, and forestry) is not covered in the MIP. Furthermore, NACE 1 
serves as the reference category and is omitted. Because of few observations available, NACE 
9 is matched with NACE 8. 
Is there a problem of omitted variables? Since this paper deals with innovation impacts of 
regulation one might argue that R&D expenditures also need to be considered. But as men-
tioned before the CIS measures adoption/diffusion of innovation so that the paper focuses on 
the adoption of environmental technology due to regulation constraints. Therefore, controlling 
for R&D would provide little insights. In addition to this, we only considered observations, in 
which companies stated regulations to be responsive for introduced innovations. This means 
that we do not consider a choice decision to invest in environmental R&D or not. We take the 
decision that environmental technologies are adopted due to regulative constraints as fact.   
6 Results 
The empirical results are listed in table 3 below. 
a b c d e f g h i
VARIABLES I_MAT I_ENE I_CO2 I_AIR I_H2O I_SOI I_NOI I_DAN I_REC
T_EOP 0.163 0.182 0.164 0.171 0.522* 0.167 0.437* 0.244 0.382*
(0.192) (0.189) (0.195) (0.213) (0.209) (0.230) (0.205) (0.198) (0.189)
T_CFE 0.0134 -0.330 -0.252 -0.742** 0.00673 -0.0904 -0.0701 0.602** 0.510**
(0.184) (0.181) (0.186) (0.203) (0.195) (0.217) (0.194) (0.191) (0.182)
T_CPO 0.187 0.618** 0.688** 0.294 0.0573 -0.116 0.204 -0.353 -0.00198
(0.208) (0.205) (0.209) (0.223) (0.223) (0.246) (0.219) (0.219) (0.204)
ln_AGE 0.0637 -0.000171 0.239** 0.251** 0.372** 0.299** 0.204* -0.274** 0.0704
(0.0811) (0.0777) (0.0801) (0.0809) (0.0827) (0.0877) (0.0819) (0.0836) (0.0772)
zero_dummy 0.206 0.283 0.844** 0.743** 0.161 0.201 0.383 -0.594* 0.376
(0.279) (0.267) (0.268) (0.271) (0.315) (0.333) (0.277) (0.298) (0.261)
ln_SIZE 0.170** 0.161** 0.136** 0.144** 0.102** 0.0650 0.0919** 0.107** 0.0264
(0.0327) (0.0330) (0.0322) (0.0332) (0.0345) (0.0363) (0.0333) (0.0339) (0.0311)
EAST 0.0797 -0.142 -0.113 -0.164 -0.0834 -0.0801 -0.150 -0.206 -0.0374
(0.126) (0.120) (0.124) (0.128) (0.136) (0.146) (0.131) (0.131) (0.119)
sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant
α_1 (cut_1) 0.313 -0.273 0.585 0.875* 1.117** 1.142** 1.015** -0.119 -0.320
(0.323) (0.319) (0.322) (0.340) (0.343) (0.368) (0.334) (0.338) (0.317)
α_2 (cut_2) 0.984** 0.498 1.213** 1.472** 1.668** 1.707** 1.652** 0.495 0.458
(0.325) (0.320) (0.325) (0.343) (0.346) (0.372) (0.338) (0.338) (0.316)
α_3 (cut_3) 2.226** 1.412** 2.033** 2.151** 2.372** 2.249** 2.532** 1.251** 1.211**
(0.337) (0.324) (0.332) (0.350) (0.353) (0.381) (0.353) (0.341) (0.319)
Observations 419 419 419 419 419 419 419 419 419
Pseudo-R2 0.0872 0.0769 0.0822 0.0915 0.0869 0.0563 0.0549 0.0888 0.0269
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0.000146 2.84e-06 0 0.00584
Table 3: Estimation results (ordered probit model)
Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Includes seven sector dummies based on NACE one-digit level industries
 
The results point out that the study is able to identify long-term impacts of environmental 
regulation on innovation for five out of nine cases of environmental related innovation. In 
detail, the age variable (ln_AGE) provides strong significant positive impact on innovations 
with positive benefits on CO2 emission (c), other air pollutants (d), water pollution (e), soil 
pollution (g), and finally weak significance for noise burdens (g). But these findings cannot be 
treated without some scepticism. Especially for innovation reducing water pollution, this find-
ing is still biased because water pollution control regulations are just old. However, a strong 
significant negative impact was identified for innovation related to a reduction of hazardous 
inputs. Energy efficiency regulation and also material efficiency regulation are of more recent 
date which may lead to the outcome of no impact of the age variable. Although recycling im-
provement regulations were introduced in 1990s, the time variable was found to be insignifi-
cant. Such a result of no long term effects of this type may be biased due to the very often 
cited new RoHS guideline from 2005 within this policy type. 
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In contrast to the hypothesis of long-term effects triggered by regulations, the hypothesis 
that environmental innovation is triggered by different policy phases cannot be confirmed in 
general. Surprisingly, the class of end-of-pipe regulations only has weak impacts on innova-
tion for a reduction of water pollution (e), noise reduction (g), and on improvement of recy-
cling (i). One reason for this outcome, especially for its impact on innovation for reducing 
water pollution could be that German end-of-pipe regulations often deal with water pollution 
control (Jänicke et al., 2003). In contrast to these findings, the results indicate significant im-
pact of the circular flow economy type on the innovation, resulting in positive benefits for 
improving recycling possibilities and a reduction of hazardous input use. This policy types 
also have a negative significant impact on innovation related to air emission reductions. This 
can be explained by the fact that cleaner production measures often reduce energy and mate-
rial use, but they do not, on the other hand, necessarily lower air emissions. The results for the 
climate policy type indicate strong support for the idea that innovation related to increase en-
ergy efficiency or to reduce CO2 emissions is triggered by this policy phase or type. 
Company size as a control variable for cross-sectional differences in corporate size is a 
factor of some importance, especially with regard to the adoption of innovations. Company 
size has a strong positive impact for almost all environmental benefits except for innovation 
related to benefits on soil and noise burdens. A possible reason for this finding could be that 
larger companies tend to engage more in capital intensive large scale production, which can 
be assumed to be more pollution intensive than small scale production. Consequently, these 
companies might be more affected by environmental regulation than smaller ones. The 
dummy for the Eastern part of Germany has no significant impact at all. Since the sector 
dummies are only used to control for possible heterogeneity related to differences in the strin-
gency of regulation across sectors, they are not presented in the results but included in the 
regression. 
Finally, some words of caution should be addressed at this point. The findings of the 
study should also be treated with some scepticism. The goodness of fit value of all tested 
cases of environmental related innovations turns out to be very low. A reason for this is surely 
that only observations are considered if companies report that innovations were introduced 
due the corresponding regulations. But suppose for instance, the case in which a company 
reported that innovations were triggered by say recycling standards. If this company also in-
troduced for instance energy saving innovations, the determinants of these innovations are 
omitted, and without any doubts, they are others than for the innovations for improving recy-
cling. This problem could be one reason for the weak performance of the policy type vari-
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ables, or even for the negative impact of some policy phases or types on innovation related to 
completely different environmental benefits. 
7 Conclusion 
This paper investigated two central questions. First: the question whether there are long-
term effects of environmental regulation on innovation with environmental benefits and sec-
ond: whether different types of environmental policy differ in their impact on several envi-
ronmental benefits of triggered innovations. 
The present paper addressed both research questions by relying on MIP data from the 
2009 survey where firms are asked to cite the regulations to be responsive for introduced in-
novations with environmental benefits. 
In order to shed light on the first question of interest, the age of the respective regulations 
was calculated. The ordered probit regression results support this hypothesis for the majority 
of environmental benefits of innovations. However, the results do not provide proof for envi-
ronmental benefits in cases of material use and energy efficiency, or for compensation of dan-
gerous inputs and improvement of recycling possibilities.  
The second question regarding the impact of different phases of environmental policy on 
environmentally related innovations was approached by categorizing regulations into three 
different policy phases or types: end-of-pipe, circular-flow-economy, and finally, climate-
policy regulations. This classification represents a content-based and temporal order. These 
environmental regulation types were expected to differ in their influence on triggering innova-
tion by means of several environmental impacts. Considering the results, this hypothesis does 
not hold in general. But some evidence was found that there is a significant effect of all policy 
phases or types on innovation with strong related environmental impacts. However, the sig-
nificance of the results for the end-of-pipe regulation is weak. 
Nonetheless, the estimation of long-term effects of environmental regulation on environ-
mentally related innovations provide some insights that even very old regulations have trig-
gered such innovation until today. Thus, command-and-control regulations, to which the over-
whelming majority of regulations cited in our database accounts for, provide long term incen-
tives to innovate. In this sense, our results are somewhat surprising since command-and-
control regulation is expected to offer no or at least little dynamic incentives to innovate or 
adopt new technologies.  
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